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Abstract
Long-lived public infrastructure (for example roads) complements
private goods (cars) and may perpetuate carbon-intensive demand pat-
terns and technologies far into the future. Thus, climate policy must
combine ‘direct’ instruments such as carbon taxation with public in-
vestment shifts (from roads towards rails or bicycle paths). This is par-
ticularly important and complex because infrastructure supply changes
slowly and carbon taxation may be politically constrained:
This paper shows that if carbon taxation is non-optimal, infrastructure
provision should be used to actively change private behavior. Neverthe-
less, if one instrument is restricted, the other may also have to be less
ambitious: Intuitively, if clean infrastructure provision is non-optimal,
polluting should also be penalized less (and vice versa), unless welfare
gains from environmental quality are large.
More precisely, for two public goods complementing private goods in
utility, general second-best policy conditions are derived and applied
to a specific utility function. Constrained public spending composition
leaves the (Pigouvian) tax rule unchanged, but constrained taxation
implies that the environmental externality enters the condition for pub-
lic spending composition. Nevertheless, the second-best level of either
policy instrument is below its first-best when ‘dirty’ consumption is
sufficiently important in utility.
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1 INTRODUCTION 2
1 Introduction
The feasibility and costs of climate change mitigation crucially depend on
how fast capital stocks can be adapted to the use of low-carbon technologies.
This importantly includes public capital stocks without direct greenhouse
gas (GHG) emissions: public goods that complement private goods may
perpetuate GHG-intensive demand patterns and technologies. For example,
transport infrastructure and related urban form affect GHG emissions via
the number and distance of trips and transport mode choice (Sims et al.,
2014; Seto et al., 2014). These perpetuating effects are amplified by par-
ticularly long lifetimes of most types of infrastructure (Jaccard and Rivers,
2007; Shalizi and Lecocq, 2010). As a consequence, staying within an ‘emis-
sions budget’ consistent with a 2 ◦C target may even require the retirement
of existing infrastructure (Guivarch and Hallegatte, 2011). Thus, infras-
tructure policies are important mitigation instruments, along with financial
incentives or regulations that address GHG emissions directly (Shalizi and
Lecocq, 2010), and both types of instruments need to be adjusted to each
other. For example in transport, a fuel tax is inefficient at reducing car use
if there are no viable alternatives. Therefore, sufficient infrastructures for
public and non-motorized transport are required (May and Roberts, 1995),
potentially at the expense of road investments. Similarly, subsidies for buy-
ing or using electric vehicles are ineffective without a network of publicly
accessible charging stations.
Nevertheless, the role of infrastructure in environmental policy is often
neglected both by environmental economics1 and public economics (see be-
low). This may reflect that a ‘division of labor’ between environmental and
infrastructure policy is optimal as long as each does an ‘optimal job’ (of
setting prices so that environmental damages are fully internalized, and of
matching resulting demands, respectively). A division of labor is appropriate
even if the composition of infrastructure provision affects the composition
of private consumption. It may break down, however, if either environmen-
tal taxation or public spending is restricted, which may be the rule rather
than the exception in practical policy-making. If infrastructure cannot be
adapted optimally (at least in the short run),2 should this be compensated
by a higher carbon price? Vice versa, if environmental pricing is politically
restricted, should more public funds and public space be allocated to infras-
tructure that supports ‘clean transport’, and less to roads and parking?
In this paper, I thus analyze the links between two policy variables: an
environmental tax, and the ratio of spending on two public goods which are
1For example, the Handbook of Environmental Economics (Ma¨ler and Vincent, 2003)
does not consider infrastructure investment or urban planning.
2In addition to long capital stock lifetimes, infrastructure adaptation may be impeded
by long planning and construction times, administrative and legislative obstacles, or public
opposition.
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complementary to clean and dirty private consumption goods, respectively.
The first main result establishes public spending as a second-best envi-
ronmental policy instrument on a par with environmental pricing: whenever
an environmental tax does not fully internalize the damages, it is optimal to
use public good provision to actively change private behavior, rather than
to just ‘match demand’. In turn, when public good provision is not optimal,
the environmental tax rate changes (but not the tax rule).
The second main result concerns the value of second-best policy variables
relative to their first-best: if one policy instrument is restricted, the other in-
strument should not always be reinforced to compensate this, but may have
to be set to a less ambitious level as well. More precisely, this holds for the
case that dirty consumption relative to clean consumption, and composite
consumption relative to environmental quality, are ‘sufficiently important’
for individuals’ utility: then, if either the environmental tax rate or the pub-
lic spending ratio is constrained below its first-best level, the second-best
level of the other policy variable is also lower than its respective first-best.
Further, a tighter constraint means an even lower second-best level of the
other policy variable.
Intuitively, to the degree that alternative infrastructure (for example for
cycling or public transport) that would ‘attract’ clean consumption cannot
be provided to the optimal level, the ‘penalty’ for polluting behavior (for
example by a fuel tax) should also be smaller. Vice versa, if carbon pric-
ing does not provide optimal incentives for a change in private behavior,
alternative infrastructure would be oversupplied under the first-best spend-
ing composition. (Both under the conditions that environmental quality is
endogenous, and that welfare gains from higher environmental quality are
not too large.)
The results are formally derived in a static model, but also have an
important interpretation in dynamic settings: the speed at which the en-
vironmental tax rate should be increased to its first-best is determined by
the speed of public capital stock restructuring. Given the often substantial
planning lead time and lumpiness of infrastructure investments, they should
precede environmental tax increases. Such a long-term perspective is not
always adopted, as I will illustrate using the example of rail and road infras-
tructure investments in countries that have committed to climate change
mitigation.
The present paper fills a gap in the public economics literature, in which
environmental policy is often treated as a topic in optimal taxation: envi-
ronmental taxes are analyzed as a source of public funds, in settings that
are second-best because no lump-sum taxes are available. Models of optimal
environmental taxation often include public goods – but they are commonly
assumed to be (weakly) separable from private consumption, or there is only
one public good (Bovenberg and Goulder, 2002), so the effect of the com-
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position of public spending on the environment cannot be elucidated. As
an exception, Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1994) model two public goods
and allow for public-private complementarity. However, they again only use
it for the analysis of second-best settings without lump-sum taxes, and to
determine the optimal level of public goods that are themselves polluting or
emission-reducing.
A few numerical studies on climate change mitigation pathways examine
the link between carbon pricing and infrastructure: Waisman et al. (2012,
2013) illustrate that a given abatement target can be achieved by a lower
carbon price (and at lower costs) when it is combined with transport-specific
policies, including a given recomposition of transport infrastructure invest-
ment. In an urban context, Avner et al. (2014) show how public transport
infrastructure increases the price elasticity of CO2 emissions, and thus the
efficiency and effectiveness of a carbon- or gasoline tax. However, these stud-
ies are numerical, the composition of infrastructure investments are chosen
ad hoc, and no attempt is made to find the optimal public policy to com-
plement carbon pricing.
This paper proceeds as follows: Section 2.1 describes a model in which
environmental quality enters utility, and two types of public spending com-
plement a clean and dirty private good to yield ‘green’ and ‘brown’ compos-
ite goods, respectively. Section 2.2 shows that the government can induce
a shift towards clean consumption either by a change in the environmental
tax, or by providing a different combination of public goods. The relative
size of the marginal effects depends on the elasticity of substitution between
‘green’ and ‘brown’ composite goods, and on the elasticity of the composite
goods with respect to their respective public input.
Section 3 derives general optimal policy conditions, and Section 4 applies
them to a (CES-based) utility specification, each for first- and second-best
cases:
In the first-best benchmark, when a Pigouvian environmental tax inter-
nalizes the entire environmental damage, the optimality condition for the ac-
companying composition of public spending simply requires equal marginal
utilities of composite consumption across public goods – independently of
environmental quality or any private-public complementarity (Section 3.1).
With a specific utility structure, this implies that the composition of public
spending equals the composition of private spending (Section 4.1).
In the second-best, a binding constraint on the composition of public
spending leaves the Pigouvian tax rule intact, but the tax rate will be dif-
ferent, because the marginal utility of dirty consumption depends on the
composition of public spending (Section 3.2.1). If the parameters in the
exemplary utility function are such that dirty consumption is sufficiently
important, I find that the second-best tax is lower than in the first-best,
and that the more the composition of public spending is restricted, the
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lower the tax (Section 4.2.1).
If there is a binding constraint on the environmental tax rate, the second-
best condition for public spending also contains the marginal effects of public
spending on the environment (via dirty private consumption). This reflects
the role of the composition of public spending as an environmental policy
when the environmental tax does not fully internalize damages (Section
3.2.2). However, if dirty consumption is again specified to be sufficiently
important, the second-best share of ‘clean public spending’ is lower than in
the first-best, and the more the environmental tax is restricted, the lower
the share (Section 4.2.2).
Section 5.1 discusses implications in a dynamic setting, and demon-
strates that transport infrastructure investments in many countries do not
yet match long-term climate change mitigation objectives. Section 5.2 dis-
cusses variations of the model.
Section 6 concludes.
2 A model of private consumption with comple-
mentary public goods
This section first describes a model of household consumption for analyzing
the role of public spending composition as an explicit policy instrument (in
combination with environmental taxation). The key assumption is a utility
function in which clean and dirty private goods are each complemented by a
specific public good (rather than being separable).3 Then, the households’
optimality conditions are used to derive the private response to marginal
changes in arbitrary government policies. Later sections will consider opti-
mal policies.
2.1 Production and household consumption
Production in our model is very stylized. There are N identical households
each supplying one unit of labor as the only input to production.4 Output
can be used for clean or dirty private goods (C,D) or two corresponding
public goods (X,Z). Thus, the commodity market equilibrium is5
N = NC +ND +X + Z. (1)
3A similar model could be constructed for the production side, with clean and dirty
private inputs complemented by two types of public goods and environmental quality as
a (weakly) separable input.
4To focus on the relation between environmental taxation and the composition of public
spending, I neglect the private choice between labor and leisure and allow for lump-sum
taxation to balance the government’s budget.
5Units have been normalized such that the constant rates of transformation is set to
one.
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The representative household’s utility is
U = U {Q[G(C,X), B(D,Z)], E} . (2)
Here, E = E(ND) denotes environmental quality (with END < 0), which
is assumed to be (weakly) separable from all other inputs to utility. In
contrast to the standard model, private consumption and public spending
are not separable: private goods C,D combined with public goods X,Z
yield ‘green’ and ‘brown’ composite intermediate goods G,B, respectively,
which in turn determine the subutility of consumption Q. Furthermore,
assume that Gi > 0, Gii ≤ 0, Bk > 0, Bkk ≤ 0, and that C,X and D,Z
are complements in the sense that Gij > 0 and Bkl > 0 (with i, j ∈ {C,X},
k, l ∈ {D,Z} and Gi := ∂G/∂i, etc.).
Households take prices, public spending and environmental quality as
given and maximize (2) subject to their budget constraint
C + (1 + τ)D = 1− T, (3)
where τ ≥ 0 is a tax on dirty consumption and T a lump-sum tax. The
first-order optimality conditions are
UC = λ, (4a)
UD = λ(1 + τ), (4b)
with λ denoting the marginal utility of income. Thus, the marginal rate of
substitution (MRUS) between dirty and clean private goods is
QD
QC
=
QBBD
QGGC
= 1 + τ. (5)
If functions G and B are given, the optimal recomposition of private con-
sumption in response to marginal changes in policy parameters can be de-
rived from this condition under the assumption that Q is homothetic (see
Section 2.2).
If additionally, functions U and Q are fully specified, one can use (5) and
(3) to obtain demands as explicit functions of policy parameters
C = C(τ, T,X,Z), (6a)
D = D(τ, T,X,Z). (6b)
Section 4 discusses an example based on a constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) specification for Q.
2.2 Households’ response to marginal policy variations
If Q is homothetic, the marginal rate of substitution between composites
QB/QG is a function of the ratio of composite goods G/B. Totally differ-
entiating (5) then yields
1
σ
(G˜− B˜)− (G˜C − B˜D) = τ˜ , (7)
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where a tilde denotes relative changes (except τ˜ := dτ/(1 + τ)) and σ is the
elasticity of substitution between green and brown composite goods (with
σ > 0). Thus, for a given change in the environmental tax (and public goods
X,Z, on which G,B depend), the optimal adjustment in private consump-
tion balances two effects: the change in the ratio of composite goods, and
thus in the marginal rate of substitution between composites, which is the
first term on the left-hand side (LHS) of (7); and the change in the ratio of
the marginal (sub)utilities of private goods. For general G and B, the LHS
of (7) can be expressed in terms of changes in private and public goods,
weighted by expressions containing the elasticities of G,B,GC and BD (see
(A1) in Appendix A.1).
To be more specific, I secondly assume that
G(C,X) = CαXδ, (8a)
B(D,Z) = DαZδ with 0 < α, δ ≤ 1. (8b)
Imposing the same elasticities of G and B with respect to private and public
inputs6 allows us to write (7) in terms of changes in ∆ := C/D and Ω :=
X/Z, respectively, because we then have
G/B = ∆αΩδ, (9a)
GC/BD = ∆
α−1Ωδ, (9b)
and thus:
1
σ
[
α∆˜ + δΩ˜
]
−
[
−(1− α)∆˜ + δΩ˜
]
= τ˜ . (10)
Solving this equation for ∆˜ shows
Proposition 1 (Private response to marginal policy variations). The com-
position of private consumption responds to marginal changes in the envi-
ronmental tax and the composition of public spending according to
[α+ σ(1− α)]∆˜ = στ˜ + δ(σ − 1)Ω˜. (11)
Thus, the government can achieve a change in the composition of private
consumption ∆˜ by arbitrary combinations of changes in the Pigouvian tax τ˜ ,
to make the dirty good more or less costly relative to the clean good, and in
public spending composition Ω˜ (with a proportionality factor of δ(σ−1)/σ),
to make the dirty private good more or less ‘useful’ relative to the clean
private good.
The term in the square brackets on the LHS of (11) is always positive:
an increase in the ratio of clean and dirty private goods ∆ positively affects
the ratio of green to brown composites (9a), and thus the marginal rate
6For the more general case with different elasticities, see (A2) and (A3) in Appendix
A.1.
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of substitution between composites (the first term on the LHS of (10) or
(7)); it also lowers the ratio of the marginal utilities of private goods (9b),
corresponding to the second term on the LHS of (10) or (7). Although they
are of different size, both effects work together to increase the MRUS in (5).
Such an increase is the optimal response to an increase in the price of D due
to a higher environmental tax (τ˜ > 0, Ω˜ = 0), which thus always leads to
a cleaner composition of private consumption (∆˜ > 0), as expected in the
two-good case.
More interestingly, a shift of public spending towards the public good
complementary to clean consumption (Ω˜ > 0, τ˜ = 0) does only lead to a
‘greening’ of private consumption if G and B are substitutes (σ > 1), and
otherwise to an unchanged (for σ = 1) or even more emission-intensive con-
sumption bundle (for σ < 1). The reason is that an increase in Ω affects the
marginal rate of private substitution via the same two channels as described
above for ∆ – but they now have opposite signs (the effect via the ratio
of marginal utilities of private goods is negative), and their relative size is
governed by σ (cf. (10)). For σ < 1, the positive effect via the marginal
rate of substitution between composites is stronger and the overall effect of
Ω˜ is positive. This implies that ∆ then needs to decrease for the optimality
condition to hold.
3 General optimality conditions for taxation and
public spending composition
The results so far hold for arbitrary values of the policy variables. Based
on Section 2.1, we now derive general optimality conditions for the govern-
ment’s choice of taxes and public spending composition. We start with the
government’s general welfare maximization problem and then derive opti-
mality conditions for the first-best case when all policy variables (including
a lump-sum tax) can be freely chosen, and for two second-best cases when
either the public spending composition or the environmental tax are re-
stricted. In Section 4, we will impose more structure on utility to gain
further insights for each policy case.
We approach the government’s optimization problem by using indirect
utility, obtained by substituting the demand functions (6) in (2):
V = U {Q [G(C(τ, T,X,Z), X), B(D(τ, T,X,Z), Z)] , E(ND(τ, T,X,Z))} .
(12)
This a function of the policy variables (τ, T,X,Z), which are chosen by the
government to maximize social welfare NV , subject to a budget constraint
X + Z = NT +NτD (13)
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and potential restrictions on policy instruments:
S ≤ S¯, S := X + Z (14a)
Ω ≤ Ω¯, Ω := X/Z (14b)
τ ≤ τ¯ . (14c)
The first-order conditions (simplified by using Roy’s Identity, UQQτ =
−λD, and UQQT = −λ) are
(λ− µ)D − µ(τ − τp)Dτ = ν/N, (15a)
(λ− µ)− µ(τ − τp)DT = 0, (15b)
UQQX + µ(τ − τp)DX = (µ− ξ − ζ/Z)/N, (15c)
UQQZ + µ(τ − τp)DZ = (µ− ξ + ζX/Z2)/N, (15d)
where λ = UC is the marginal utility of income, µ is the marginal utility loss
of raising one unit of public funds, ξ, ζ and ν are the multipliers associated
with (14a)-(14c), and
τp :=
NUE(−E(ND))
µ
(16)
denotes the ‘Pigouvian’ environmental tax rate.
3.1 First-best policies
General conditions for the first-best environmental tax and spending compo-
sition follow directly:7 If taxation is unrestricted, that is (14c) is non-binding
and ν = 0, (15a) and (15b) yield µ = λ and the optimal tax rate
τ∗ = τp. (17)
Furthermore, unrestricted public spending on both public goods implies
(14a) and (14b) are non-binding and ξ = ζ = 0. Using (17) in (15c) and
(15d), we then find that optimal public spending X∗, Z∗ must satisfy
QX = QZ , (18a)
N
QX
QC
= N
QZ
QC
= 1. (18b)
These are standard result for optimal environmental taxation and public
spending when lump-sum taxes are available, so that the marginal cost of
public funds µ/λ is unity (cf. Bovenberg and van der Ploeg, 1994, ch. 4): The
optimal tax on dirty consumption in (17) fully internalizes environmental
damages. Condition (18a) ensures the optimal composition of public spend-
ing by equating the marginal utility of different public goods. Equation
7‘First-best’ policies are those that reproduce the social planner’s solution, see for
example Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1994); Bovenberg and Goulder (2002).
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(18b) is the Samuelson condition (with the rate of transformation between
public and private goods equal to one).
Interestingly, these results are unaffected by assumptions about the sep-
arability of public goods in utility – more generally, they are independent of
how different types of public spending enter utility : First, the environmental
tax rate according to (17) and (16) depends only indirectly on the compo-
sition of public spending (via UE and UC , which are functions of X and Z).
Second, the terms involving DX and DZ in (15c) and (15d), representing
the environmental effect of public spending due to its effect on private con-
sumption, have disappeared in (18a) and (18b). Thus, there is a ‘division
of labor’ between the two policy instruments in the first-best: it is optimal
to use only the tax to internalize environmental damages. Public spending
composition has no role as an environmental policy instrument, but should
simply match corrected demands.
3.2 Second-best policies
The first-best results above are usually compared to second-best cases in
which the government has no access to lump-sum taxes: The second-best en-
vironmental tax may then have an additional ‘Ramsey component’ (τ−τp >
0) due to a revenue-raising motive for differentiated commodity taxation
(Sandmo, 1975; Bovenberg and Goulder, 2002). If this is the case, the
second-best equivalents of (18a) and (18b) likewise contain terms (τ−τp)DX
and (τ − τp)DZ , representing the effect of public spending on revenues from
commodity taxation (Bovenberg and van der Ploeg, 1994, ch. 4.2).
In many practical cases, however, environmental policies are further re-
stricted since a full recomposition of public capital stocks takes time (see
Section 5.1), or the government’s taxation powers may be limited. To focus
on this, the second-best analysis in the next two subsections maintains the
assumption of lump-sum taxes and considers restrictions on the levels of
Ω and τ instead: Limiting Ω does not imply a change to the structure of
optimal environmental taxation (as a restricted set of taxes would), but it
affects the tax rate (Section 3.2.1). Limiting τ does structurally change the
condition for optimal public spending, which now depends on (τ − τp) even
in the presence of a lump-sum tax – however, this is now not due to the
effect of public spending on tax revenues, but because due to the role of Ω
in addressing environmental damages (Section 3.2.2).
3.2.1 Environmental taxation under restricted public spending
composition
Assume that the government cannot adjust public spending composition to
its first-best value Ω∗, that is (14b) is binding
Ω = Ω¯ < Ω∗ (14b′)
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and ζ 6= 0 in (15c) and (15d). If the government can still choose any tax
rate, (14c) is non-binding and ν = 0 in (15a), implying µ = λ and
Proposition 2 (Second-best environmental taxation). The rule for the
second-best environmental tax is identical to the first-best case:
τ ′ = τp =
NUE(−E(ND))
λ
. (17′)
However, the level of the second-best environmental tax τ ′ will gener-
ally be different from the first-best case because restriction (14b′) on public
spending affects UE and E(ND).
Appendix A.2.1 derives the remaining conditions for second-bestX ′, Z ′, T, ξ
and ζ, depending on the total spending constraint (14a) being binding or
not.
3.2.2 Public spending composition under restricted environmen-
tal taxation
Now, assume that the government cannot adjust the environmental tax to
its first-best value and environmental damages are not fully internalized by
the tax, so (14c) is binding,
τ = τ¯ < τ∗, (14c′)
and ν 6= 0 in (15a). Together with (15b), this implies µ 6= λ (see Appendix
A.2.2 for an explicit condition).
Constraint (14b) is non-binding and ζ = 0 in (15c) and (15d), which
leads to
Proposition 3 (Second-best composition of public spending). If the envi-
ronmental tax cannot be set optimally, the composition of public spending
should additionally be used to address the environmental externality:
UQ(QZ −QX) = µ(τp − τ¯)(DZ −DX). (18a′′)
In contrast to the first-best condition (18a), the effects of public spend-
ing on dirty consumption (in the second bracket on the RHS) and thus on
the environment now directly enter its second-best equivalent (18a′′): the
composition of public spending assumes a role as an environmental policy
instrument. This role becomes more pronounced as the constrained tax level
deviates more from the ‘recommended’ Pigouvian tax level (the first bracket
on the RHS). Hence, a ‘division of labor’ between policy instruments as in
the first-best case is no longer optimal.
Appendix A.2.1 derives the remaining conditions for second-bestX ′, Z ′, T, µ
and ξ, depending on the total spending constraint (14a) being binding or
not.
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4 Results for a specific utility function
Further insights can be gained for specific functional forms for utility and
environmental quality. We first state our assumptions (extending those in
Section 2.2) and the corresponding results for household behavior. This
will then be applied in two subsections on first- and second-best policies,
respectively.
Assume that overall utility U is of Cobb-Douglas form, with elasticities
m,n. For the utility of composite consumption Q, use a CES function with
share parameter β and elasticity of substitution σ. For composite goods G
and B, use the Cobb-Douglas specification from (8). Finally, assume that
environmental quality E has a constant elasticity φ with respect to aggregate
dirty consumption:
U(Q,E) = QmEn, (19a)
Q(C,D,X,Z) = [βG(C,X)ρ + (1− β)B(D,Z)ρ]1/ρ , (19b)
G(C,X) = CαXδ, B(D,Z) = DαZδ, (19c)
E(ND) = (ND)−φ for D > 0, (19d)
with 0 < m,n < 1, (19e)
σ > 1 and ρ := (σ − 1)/σ, (19f)
0 < α, δ ≤ 1 and α+ δ < σ/(σ − 1), (19g)
φ > 0. (19h)
Parameter condition (19f) implies that G and B are substitutes; the impli-
cations of the second part of (19g) (which is satisfied for example if G and
B exhibit constant returns to scale) will become clear below. All results
below are derived under this set of assumptions without further mentioning.
Furthermore, only interior solutions with C,D,X,Z > 0 will be formally
analyzed, since otherwise E in (19d), ∆ and Ω are not defined.
We now describe households’ behavior for this specification. Evaluating
the private optimality condition (5) and solving for ∆ = C/D then yields
∆(τ,Ω) =
[
β
1− β (1 + τ)Ω
δρ
]η
, (20)
with η : = σ/(σ − α(σ − 1)).
Equation (20) describes the relation between any level (or change) of pol-
icy parameters and private consumption composition, while (11) described
only marginal changes; the intuition remains the same. When private con-
sumption is optimal, η equals the price elasticity of substitution between
clean and dirty private consumption8. From (19f) follows that η > 1 and
8Similarly, the elasticity of substitution with respect to the composition of public spend-
ing is (d∆/∆)/(dΩ/Ω) = δρη.
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∆ is a convex function of τ . Since we additionally impose (19g), we have
0 < δρη < 1 and ∆ is a concave function of Ω.
Combining (20) and the private budget constraint (3), we obtain the
demand functions
C(τ, T,Ω) = (1− T ) ∆(τ,Ω)
∆(τ,Ω) + 1 + τ
, (21a)
D(τ, T,Ω) = (1− T ) 1
∆(τ,Ω) + 1 + τ
, (21b)
which are independent of total public spending S. Substituting this back into
the utility specification (19) and using X = ΩS/(1 + Ω) and Z = S/(1 + Ω),
we may obtain the indirect utility functions Qˆ = Qˆ(τ, T,Ω, S) (see (A8) in
Appendix A.3).
4.1 First-best policies for a specific utility function
To evaluate the first-best tax condition (17), write the Pigouvian tax (16)
in terms of elasticities ij of variable i with respect to j,
τp =
UE(−E(ND))
UQQGGC
∆(τ,Ω). (22)
The results of private optimization (20), (21) and (A8) yield
QG = ∆(τ,Ω)/ [∆(τ,Ω) + 1 + τ ] , (23)
while all other elasticities are constant as specified in (19), so
τp = τp(τ,Ω) =
nφ
mα
[∆(τ,Ω) + 1 + τ ] . (24)
In the first-best, (17) implies that τ on the RHS and τp on the LHS are
equal.
Furthermore, we can evaluate the first-order condition for the composi-
tion of public goods (18a) using the expression for indirect utility (A8).
We thus find that the first-best environmental tax and composition of
public spending, τ∗ and Ω∗, need to satisfy
τ =
nφ
mα
[∆(τ,Ω) + 1 + τ ] , (25a)
(Ω)1−δρη =
[
β
1− β (1 + τ)
(η−1)/η
]η
. (25b)
Using (20) in (25b) reveals a simple relation between first-best private
and public spending patterns:
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Figure 1: Illustration of the implicit conditions (27) and (31) for the first-
and second-best environmental tax. (Parameters: m = 0.75, n = 0.25, σ =
3, β = 0.4, α = 0.8, δ = 0.2, φ = 0.5, Ω¯ = 0.2.)
Proposition 4 (Equality of private- and first-best public spending composi-
tions). The first-best public spending composition equals the private spending
composition:
Ω∗ =
∆(τ∗,Ω∗)
1 + τ∗
. (26)
Furthermore, substituting (25b) into (25a) yields an implicit (necessary)
condition for the first-best environmental tax τ∗:
τ =
nφ
mα
[∆∗(τ) + 1 + τ ] , (27)
with ∆∗(τ) : =
[
β
1− β (1 + τ)
1−δρ
]η/(1−δρη)
.
Here, ∆∗ is the ratio of clean to dirty private goods as a function of the
first-best environmental tax only. Once τ∗ has been determined, the cor-
responding optimal public spending composition Ω∗ can be otained from
(25b). Interpreting the left- and right-hand side (LHS and RHS) of (27) as
functions of τ permits a qualitative analysis of this condition (see Figure 1):
Assumptions (19f) and (19g) imply that the overall exponent of the (1 +
τ)-term in the expression for ∆∗ exceeds unity, so both ∆∗ and the entire
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RHS of (27) increase at a growing rate in τ , from a positive value for τ = 0.
The term in square brackets on the RHS is always larger than τ on the LHS.
Thus, a necessary condition for the existence of a solution is that utility is
less sensitive to changes in aggregate pollution than to changes in composite
consumption,9 that is, if
mα > nφ. (28)
To derive a sufficient condition, note that the existence of a solution to
(27) requires that the Pigouvian tax on the RHS does not grow ‘too fast’
in τ , so that the LHS of (27) is tangent to or intersects the RHS (Fig. 1
illustrates the latter case). To be more precise, define
M :=
mα
nφ
, H :=
η − δρη
1− δρη , R :=
[
β
1− β
]η/(1−δρη)
. (29)
Then, we can show
Lemma 5. The first-order optimality condition (27) for the first-best envi-
ronmental tax τ∗ has
two solutions
one solution
no solutions
 if (M − 1)HMH−1

>
=
<
 HH(H − 1)H−1R. (30)
If there are two solutions to (27), the smaller one is the solution to the
government’s welfare maximization problem.
Proof. The derivation of (30) is technical and moved to Appendix A.4. Iden-
tifying the maximum in the two-solution case is more instructive:
The parameter condition (30) implies that there may be two solutions to
(27), denoted by τL and τH with τL < τH , if the brown relative to the green
composite good and overall consumption relative to environment quality
are sufficiently important in social welfare.10 Additionally, τ → ∞ by (21)
implies ever-decreasing D and ever-increasing E by (19d), so that social
welfare goes to infinity by (19a). At the other extreme, an arbitrarily small
environmental tax will always yield higher social welfare than τ = 0. Thus,
τL must locally maximize social welfare, τH locally minimizes it, and there
is only one finite solution to the government’s unrestricted maximization
problem: τ∗ = τL, and a low Ω∗(τL) according to (25b).
9Here, the sensitivity to changes in private consumption is measured by UQGC = mα;
since QG depends on τ and Ω, it does not appear in this condition on parameters. The
sensitivity to changes in aggregate pollution is simply the elasticity U(ND) = −nφ.
10Both the LHS and RHS of (30) increase with σ and α; but if m is large or n and φ
are small, only the LHS is large, and if β is small, only the RHS is small.
The necessary condition (28) is contained in (30), since the RHS of (30) is always positive
but the LHS is non-positive if M ≤ 1.
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Thus, a low environmental tax rate is preferable to an ‘intermediate’
tax if dirty consumption contributes relatively strongly to utility. This is
only compensated by environmental quality gains if the environmental tax
is beyond an upper threshold, which we may denote by τcrit.
That the tax can never be high enough once it is above τcrit is an artifact
of our modeling choice for environmental quality (19d). Alternatively, we
could for example introduce an upper bound on E (or a lower bound on D),
which would be reached at a finite tax rate τ¯ : then, if τ¯ > τcrit, this corner
solution replaces the interior solution τL as the global optimum.
If the environment or the clean composite good are sufficiently important
in utility, (30) implies that (27) has no solution. In this case, a potential
loss of utility from composite consumption due to a tax increase is always
overcompensated by the corresponding increase in welfare due to higher
environmental quality: the local maximum and minimum disappear, an in-
crease in τ always increases welfare, and there is no finite solution to the
first-best problem. Again, a different specification of (19d) would take care
of this.
Figure 3 plots the numerical solution to (27) and (25b) for two elasticities
of substitution.
4.2 Second-best policies for a specific utility function
We now apply the general results of Section 3.2 and analyze scenarios with
binding constraints on policy variables.
4.2.1 Environmental taxation under restricted public spending
composition
Using (19)-(21) and (A8) in (17′) gives an implicit condition that a second-
best environmental tax τ ′ needs to satisfy:
τ =
nφ
mα
[
∆(τ, Ω¯) + 1 + τ
]
. (31)
This equation has the same form as (25a) for the first-best case, only that the
exogenous parameter Ω¯ replaces Ω∗, so that (31) can be directly compared
to (27) (cf. Fig. 1). In analogy to the first-best case, the following sufficient
condition for the existence of solutions can be derived:
Lemma 6. If there is a binding constraint Ω¯ on the composition of public
spending, the first-order optimality condition (31) for the second-best envi-
ronmental tax τ ′ has
two solutions
one solution
no solutions
 if (M − 1)ηMη−1

>
=
<
 ηη(η − 1)η−1R1−δρηΩ¯δρη. (32)
4 RESULTS FOR A SPECIFIC UTILITY FUNCTION 17
If there are two solutions, the smaller one satisfies
∆τ (τ
′, Ω¯) <
mα
nφ
− 1. (33)
If there is only one solution, this holds with equality.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
The upper bound Ω¯ may be binding either because it is below the first-
best solution for public spending composition, or because there is no finite
first-best solution (see above).
Again, (32) implies that mα > nφ (cf. (28)) is a necessary condition
for the existence of a second-best τ ′. Otherwise, if environmental quality is
too important for utility, there is no interior solution (unlike Fig. 1, which
illustrates the two-solution case, the curve representing the Pigouvian tax
term on the RHS of (31) is then ‘too high and too steep’).
If there are two solutions to (31), by the same reasoning as for the first-
best case we identify the smaller value of the tax as the one that locally
maximizes social welfare, so it represents the unique (finite) solution to the
government’s second-best optimization problem.11 Thus, (33) implies that
at the second-best, a change in the private composition of consumption in
response to a tax change must not exceed a threshold which again depends
on the scaling factor of the Pigouvian tax term on the RHS of (31).
Further, we can show
Proposition 7 (Characteristics of second-best environmental taxation). If
a first-best solution (τ∗,Ω∗) exists, there is a second-best environmental tax
τ ′ for any Ω¯ < Ω∗ with
τ ′ < τ∗. (34)
Independent of a first-best solution, if Ω¯1 permits a solution τ
′(Ω¯1), under
a tighter constraint Ω¯2 < Ω¯1 there is a solution τ
′(Ω¯2) with
τ ′(Ω¯2) < τ ′(Ω¯1). (35)
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
Thus, the more public spending composition is constrained, the more
the second-best environmental tax will be below the first-best. Both policy
variables affect the private consumption composition in the same direction.
In other words, if clean private consumption contributes too little to util-
ity because there is a lack of matching infrastructure to make it useful, dirty
consumption (that is relatively well-supported by infrastructure) should not
be penalized as much as under the first-best. To give an intuitive example
from transport, car drivers should be penalized somewhat less if alternative
11As for the first-best case, a finite corner solution may result from a limit on E or D.
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transport infrastructure is not sufficient to ‘pull’ them out of their cars. It
should be noted that this is not necessarily an argument for lowering ac-
tually existing environmental taxes, which may often not even be at the
second-best level (τ < τ ′ < τ∗).
The result is illustrated in Figure 1, where the curve representing the
Pigouvian tax term on the RHS in (31) is lower than for the first-best case,
so its first intersection with the LHS is at a lower τ value. A lower Ω¯ pushes
this curve further down.
Figure 3 plots the second-best environmental tax rate (obtained numer-
ically from (31)) as a function of Ω¯, for two different elasticities of substitu-
tion.
4.2.2 Public spending composition under restricted environmen-
tal taxation
Using (19)-(21) and (A8) first in (A4), and then together with this result in
(18a′′) gives the following implicit equation that the second-best composition
of public spending Ω′ must satisfy:
Ω =
∆
1 + τp
[
1 +
η
M
τp − τ¯
τp
(1 + Ω)
]
, (36)
with ∆ = ∆(τ¯ ,Ω) and τp = τp(τ¯ ,Ω). This expression reflects the assump-
tion that τp 6= τ¯ in two ways: The first fraction on the RHS, the ratio of
the marginal total (that is, private and social) costs of clean and dirty con-
sumption, does not equal the private spending ratio (see below). The second
term on the RHS, in square brackets, implies that if private consumption
composition is not optimally adjusted via an environmental tax, the effect
of Ω on private consumption composition should be used as a (partial) com-
pensation, instead of simply ‘matching’ it to private spending (as implied by
the first-best condition (26)). More precisely, we can show that the second
term is larger than one, so the second-best composition of public spending
must exceed the ratio of the marginal total costs of consumption:
Proposition 8 (Characteristics of second-best public spending composition,
part I). If environmental taxation is constrained to τ¯ , (36) may have at most
two (non-zero) solutions.
Any solution Ω′ satisfies
Ω >
∆(τ¯ ,Ω)
1 + τp(τ¯ ,Ω)
. (37)
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
Again, the upper bound τ¯ may be binding either because it is below the
first-best solution for environmental taxation, or because there is no finite
first-best solution.
4 RESULTS FOR A SPECIFIC UTILITY FUNCTION 19
 0
 0.5
 1
 1.5
 2
 2.5
 0  0.5  1  1.5  2  2.5
Ω
∆*(Ω) / [ 1 + τ*(Ω) ]
Ω
∆/(1+τP) [1 + η/M (τP-–τ)/τP (1+Ω)]
∆(–τ,Ω) / [ 1 + –τ ]
∆(–τ,Ω) / [ 1 + τP(–τ,Ω) ]
 0
 2000
 4000
 0  2000  4000
Figure 2: Illustration of the implicit conditions (26) and (36) for the
first- and second-best composition of public spending. (Parameters: m =
0.75, n = 0.25, σ = 3, β = 0.4, α = 0.8, δ = 0.2, φ = 0.5, τ¯ = 0.2.)
The complexity of (36) severely limits the insights that can be proved
analytically. For example, we cannot derive a parameter condition similar
to (30) or (32) for the number of its solutions. Instead, Proposition 8 only
makes a qualitative statement based on the analysis of the shape of the LHS
and RHS of (36), interpreted as functions of a general Ω. Figure 2 plots
these two functions; their intersections solve the equation.
The same figure illustrates (37), because the curve representing the RHS
is above the curve for the ratio of the marginal total costs of consumption
at Ω′.12
If there are two solutions to (36), it is again the smaller value that locally
maximizes social welfare and represents the unique (finite) solution to the
government’s second-best optimization problem: regardless of any limit on
the tax, Ω→∞ implies that E goes to infinity, too, and U with it. Thus, the
larger value of Ω′ must yield a (local or global) minimum of social welfare,
and the smaller value a local maximum.13
Beyond this, in numerical simulations, I could not find a parameter com-
12For the parameters used in Figure 2, this is even the case for all Ω. For other parameter
combinations, in particular for τ¯ close to τ∗, this may not be the case for Ω < Ω′.
13As above, a finite corner solution may result from introducing a limit on E or D, and
may replace the interior solution as the global optimum if it yields higher social welfare.
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bination that qualitatively changes the relative positions of the intersections
of the curves in Figure 2. This leads to
Conjecture 9 (Characteristics of second-best public spending composition,
part II). Assume that environmental taxation is constrained to τ¯ .
Then, first, the second-best public spending composition exceeds the pri-
vate spending composition:
Ω′ >
∆(τ¯ ,Ω′L)
1 + τ¯
. (38)
Second, if a first-best solution (τ∗,Ω∗) exists, there is a second-best com-
positions of public spending Ω′ for any τ¯ < τ∗, with
Ω′ < Ω∗. (39)
Third, independent of a first-best solution, if τ¯1 permits a second-best
solution Ω′(τ¯1), under a tighter constraint τ¯2 < τ¯1 there is a second-best
Ω′(τ¯2) with
Ω′(τ¯2) < Ω′(τ¯1). (40)
Condition (38) in the first part of the conjecture is stronger than (37). In
contrast to the first-best condition (26), the private spending ratio is lower
than the second-best public spending composition because a constrained
environmental tax implies that the former is too small, and that the latter
plays a role in changing private behavior.
The interpretation of the other two parts of the conjecture is similar
to their counterparts in Proposition 6: The more environmental taxation
is constrained, the more the second-best composition of public spending
will be below the first-best composition. Both policy variables affect the
composition of private consumption in the same direction. Returning to the
intuitive example from transport, this implies that spending on alternative
infrastructure such as rails or bicycle paths should not increase too much if
fuel prices cannot be made high enough to ‘push’ people out of their cars.
Again, this is not an argument for lowering actually existing spending on
clean infrastructure, which may still be below the second-best level in many
cases (Ω < Ω′ < Ω∗; cf. Section 5.1).
Furthermore, Figure 2 illustrates that even though the solution Ω′ to
(36) converges to Ω∗ as τ¯ → τ∗, the RHS of (36) does not converge to the
RHS of (26) for all other Ω.
Figure 3 shows numerically obtained solutions of (36) for the second-
best public spending compositions Ω′ as a function of τ¯ , for two different
elasticities of substitution.
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Figure 3: Environmental tax and public spending composition in the first-
best case (τ∗,Ω∗) and second-best cases (τ ′(Ω¯) and Ω′(τ¯)), each for σ = 1.5
and σ = 3 (other parameters: m = 0.75, n = 0.25, β = 0.4, α = 0.8, δ =
0.2, φ = 0.5).
5 Remarks and extensions
5.1 Dynamic effects and the example of rail infrastructure
investment
We motivated our analysis in the introduction with examples from the trans-
port sector, interpreting public spending as investment in different types of
infrastructure. Adjusting the composition of these capital stocks typically
takes a long time (Shalizi and Lecocq, 2010): planning and construction of
new infrastructure takes many years, and existing infrastructure persists for
decades unless maintenance is stopped altogether or it is actively disman-
tled, which is often politically difficult. Thus, a first-best analysis with a
static model as in Section 4.1 only describes a very long-run optimum.
However, the short-run is approximated well by the second-best analysis
in Section 4.2.1, in which an environmental tax can be immediately adjusted
while the composition of public capital is restricted. Then, it was shown that
the environmental tax rate may also have to be lower than the first-best.
Thus, in a dynamic setting, the speed at which infrastructure stocks can be
restructured to lift the restriction also determines the speed at which the
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Figure 4: Share of rail investment in total annual transport infrastructure
investment before and after ratification of the Kyoto Protocol
environmental tax rate should be increased towards its first-best. In practice,
since infrastructure projects often have substantial planning lead times, they
should thus be initiated before environmental tax increases. Since a larger
supply of clean infrastructure increases the (price) elasticities of demand for
clean and dirty goods, this would also facilitate subsequent tax increases
politically.
However, such a long-term perspective is not always adopted: For ex-
ample, Figure 4 plots annual investment in rail infrastructure as a share
of total (landbound) transport infrastructure investment in countries that
have committed to greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reductions under the
Kyoto Protocol, before and after ratification of the protocol.14 Out of 28
countries, 15 reduced their relative spending on rail infrastructure, which
is unlikely to be optimal when in the long-run, substantial GHG emission
reductions will have to come from the transport sector (Sims et al., 2014).
Three more countries increased relative spending by less than 5%, and 19
remained below 40% after ratification.
5.2 Model variants
Public goods in the production function
In the present model, environmental quality enters individual utility and
public goods affect final demand. But some environmental externalities
such as climate change also strongly affect the supply side, and firms’ choices
14The investment data was averaged over several years before the respective country’s
ratification, and from the ratification year onwards, as far as data was available from the
OECD’s ITF (2015).
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between more or less GHG-intensive inputs (such as different transport ser-
vices) are also affected by public goods and environmental taxes. This would
be reflected by a model in which environmental quality and non-separable
public goods enter firms’ production function. However, for similar func-
tional forms we may expect similar results for second-best taxation and
public spending.
Different utility function
The results in Section 4 were derived for a specific utility function. Two
assumptions are particularly noteworthy:
First, modeling environmental quality as a function of aggregate dirty
consumption by (19d) leads to cases where no finite solution to the govern-
ment’s first- or second-best problem exists. One possible remedy that pre-
serves analytical tractability is to describe environmental quality by (19d)
only up to an upper limit, and to keep it constant for lower values of aggre-
gate pollution, as discussed in Section 4.
Second, in (8) or (19c), we imposed the same elasticities of ‘brown’ and
‘green’ composite goods with respect to private and public goods (α and δ).
A numerical model should drop this assumption, but Appendix A.1 illus-
trates that the more general case with different elasticities is too complicated
for an analytical treatment as in Section 4, and the qualitative insights are
unlikely to change.
Network effects
A useful extension for a case-by-case analysis or a numerical model would
be to account for network effects in transport infrastructure:
The usefulness of an infrastructure network generally depends on its size,
with low marginal benefits of investment for very small or very large net-
works, and large marginal benefits for intermediate-sized networks. Thus,
the elasticities in the model above will not be constant, but functions of the
size of the respective network(s), and they will be very different when alter-
native networks are at different stages of development. This is particularly
relevant when considering low-income countries with little infrastructure of
any type or economies in transition with major infrastructure investments
underway (Shalizi and Lecocq, 2010; Age´nor, 2013), where a ‘lock-in’ on
high-emission development pathways may still be avoided.
Labor taxation
To focus on interactions between environmental taxation and public spend-
ing, we assumed that lump-sum are available. As mentioned in the intro-
duction, this is in contrast to a large body of public economics literature
on environmental taxation in second-best settings in which public funds
6 CONCLUSION 24
are costly because they have to be raised via a distortionary (labor) tax
(Bovenberg and Goulder, 2002). A central finding of this literature is that
the optimal environmental tax rate is below the Pigouvian tax rate, intu-
itively because it reduces dirty consumption and thus the contribution of
the environmental tax to the public budget. More precisely, the optimal tax
rate is the Pigouvian tax rate divided by the marginal costs of public funds
(MCPF).
We can expect that this still holds when additionally, a constraint on
public spending composition is introduced – as in Sections 3.2.1 and 4.2.1,
this will only change the rate, but not the structure of optimal environmental
taxation. Vice versa, the other results in 4.2.1 will not change if there is
an additional factor (one over the MCPF) in condition (31) for second-best
environmental taxation (and all expressions derived from it).
6 Conclusion
This paper analyzed environmental taxation and the composition of public
spending when public goods are complementary to private goods. I first
demonstrated how either policy instrument can be used to achieve a given
change in the composition of private consumption. Then I focused on po-
litically relevant second-best settings in which one of the two instruments is
constrained.
In general, if the share of public goods complementary to clean private
goods in total public spending cannot be increased to its first-best, this
changes the level but not the structure of optimal environmental taxation
(which is still Pigouvian). On the contrary, a limit on environmental taxa-
tion does structurally change the condition for optimal public spending and
thus also its level, because the composition of public spending now plays a
role in addressing the environmental externality.
To assess the sign of these changes in second-best policies relative to the
first-best, I used a specific utility function. First, I proved that in the first-
best, the composition of public spending equals that of private spending.
Then, I found that if clean private goods and environmental quality are not
too important in utility (in terms of their respective elasticities), a constraint
on one policy instrument implies that the level of the other instrument
should also be lower than its first-best – and the tighter the constraint,
the lower the other policy’s second-best level. For the case of second-best
taxation, this was formally proved, while the complex second-best condition
for public spending composition could only be considered numerically.
These results can most obviously be applied in the transport sector,
which is relevant for many environmental concerns such as noise, air qual-
ity, climate change, land use and biodiversity (Hensher and Button, 2003):
various private transport decisions depend not only on relative prices (that
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can be influenced by environmental taxes and subsidies), but also on com-
plementary policies such as public spending, or land use management and
urban planning.
Examples include, for GHG emission reduction, fossil fuel taxation and a
shift of investment from road- towards rail infrastructure; to reduce local (ur-
ban) environmental externalities, city tolls complemented by infrastructure
investment and land-use management in favor of public and non-motorized
private transport modes; and the provision of charging infrastructure to pro-
mote electric vehicles.
In particular, since the results suggest that price instruments should be lim-
ited as long as the composition of public goods has not been fully adjusted,
and since changing settlement patterns, urban form and infrastructure is
time-intensive, the latter should be high on the agenda of climate- and en-
vironmental policies.
More generally, the results indicate that externality pricing must take
into account the infrastructure, and that vice versa, infrastructure spend-
ing should not be viewed as a ‘downstream’ policy, only reacting to private
behavior shaped by seemingly more ‘direct’ instruments such as taxes. On
the contrary, public infrastructure can also be used to actively change pri-
vate behavior, and in realistic settings with constraints on taxes and public
spending, integrated environmental policies are required.
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A Appendix
A.1 Generalized private response to marginal policy changes
For general subutility functions G(X,Z) and B(D,Z), the total derivative
of (5) in the main part is
SCC˜ − SDD˜ = στ˜ − SXX˜ − SZZ˜, (A1)
with
SC := (θGC − σθGCC), SD := (θBD − σθBDD),
SX := (θGX − σθGCX), SZ := (θBZ − σθBDZ),
θFJ :=
∂F/∂J
F/J
, θFIJ :=
∂FI/∂J
FI/J
,
with F ∈ {G,B} and I, J ∈ {C,D,X,Z}.
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and, as usual,
1
σ
:=
∂(QB/QG)
∂(G/B)
G/B
QB/QG
.
If we choose the specific functions
G(C,X) = CαXδ with 0 < α, δ ≤ 1, (A2a)
B(D,Z) = DβZγ with 0 < β, γ ≤ 1, (A2b)
and evaluate all partial derivatives, (A1) becomes
[α− σ(α− 1)]C˜ − [β − σ(β − 1)]D˜ = στ˜ + (σ − 1)(δX˜ − γZ˜). (A3)
Setting α = β simplifies the LHS, and δ = γ the last term on the RHS, so
that we obtain (11) in the main text.
A.2 General solutions for second-best policy scenarios
This appendix derives the remaining variables of the general second-best
scenarios described Section 3.2.1.
A.2.1 The case of second-best environmental taxation
Subsection 3.2.1 already derived the condition for second-best environmental
taxation, Equation (17′).
For the remaining conditions, consider first the case when the total
spending constraint (14a) is binding. Then, second-best X ′ and Z ′ can
be determined from (14b′) and
X ′ + Z ′ = S¯. (14a′)
In this case, ξ 6= 0 in (15c) and (15d), and (18a) and (18b) are replaced by
UQ(QZ −QX) = ζ
NZ ′
(Ω¯ + 1), (18a′)
N
UQQX
UQQC
= N
UQQZ
UQQC
= 1− ξ
λ
− ζ
µZ ′
, (18b′)
which can be solved for ξ and ζ.
Second, when total public spending is unrestricted, (14a′) does not hold
– but (18a′) and (18b′), simplified by ξ = 0, still determine the total public
spending level (and ζ).
In either case, the lump-sum tax T can be determined as the ‘residual’
in the public budget (13).
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A.2.2 The case of second-best environmental taxation
Subsection 3.2.2 assumed the binding constraint τ = τ¯ < τ∗, so that ν 6= 0
in (15a). Together with (15b), this implies
µ =
λ
1− (τp − τ¯)DT =
λD − ν/N
1− (τp − τ¯)Dτ . (A4)
Further, since constraint (14b) is non-binding, we have ζ = 0, which lead to
(18a′′).
For the remaining variables, assume first that the total spending con-
straint (14a) is binding. Then, X ′ + Z ′ = S¯ and (18a′′) determine X ′ and
Z ′, and ξ 6= 0 in (15c) and (15d). Thus, (18b) is replaced by
N
UQQX + (τp − τ¯)DX
µ
= N
UQQZ + (τp − τ¯)DZ
µ
= 1− ξ
µ
, (18b′′)
which can be solved for ξ.
If total public spending is unrestricted, (18a′′) and (18b′′) simplified by
ξ = 0 determine the total public spending level.
Again, the lump-sum tax T finally follows from the public budget (13) in
either case.
A.3 Private behavior for a specific utility specification
For illustration of Section 2 and reference in Section 4.2, this appendix com-
pletes the solution of the private optimization problem for the utility spec-
ification in (19). Combining (20) with (3) we obtain the demand functions
C(τ, T,X,Z) = βηXδρη
1− T
pi
, (A5a)
D(τ, T,X,Z) =
(
1− β
1 + τ
)η
Zδρη
1− T
pi
, (A5b)
with pi := βηXδρη + (1− β)ηZδρη(1 + τ)−αρη.
Since demands are independent of total public spending S := X + Z, they
can alternatively be expressed as functions of (τ, T,Ω): using
X = ΩS/(1 + Ω), (A6a)
Z = S/(1 + Ω) (A6b)
in (A5) yields the demand functions (21) in the main text.
Substituting (A5) back into (19) yields the indirect utility of composite
consumption
Qˆ(τ, T,X,Z) = (1− T )αpi1/(ρη) (A7)
Again, using (A6) we can rewrite this as
Qˆ = Qˆ(τ, T,Ω, S) = (1− T )α
[
S
1 + Ω
]δ [1− β
1 + τ
]1/ρ
[∆ + 1 + τ ]1/(ρη) . (A8)
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A.4 Remaining formal proofs
Derivation of Equation (30) in Lemma 5. Since σ > 1 and α + δ < 1/ρ by
assumptions (19f) and (19g), we have 0 < ρ < 1, η > 1 and thus δρη < 1.
Hence, the RHS of (27) is convex and the LHS is linear.
Equation (27) has exactly one solution if its LHS describes a tangent to
its RHS. Thus, denote by τ|| a tax rate for which the derivatives of the LHS
and the RHS of (27) with respect to τ are equal, yielding
M − 1 = ∆∗τ (τ||) = HR(1 + τ||)H−1. (A9)
This can be solved for τ||, which equals the solution τ∗ if the LHS and the
RHS attain the same value: substituting τ|| back into (27) gives Condition
(30) with equality.
Equation (27) has two solutions (no solution) if at the tax level τ|| for
which the LHS and the RHS are parallel, the LHS is larger (smaller) than
the RHS:
τ|| > (<)
1
M
[
∆∗(τ||) + 1 + τ||
]
. (A10)
Using the solution of (A9) in this expression gives the upper (lower) case of
Condition (30).
Proof of Lemma 6. The derivation of Condition (32) is the same as for (27),
see the proof of Proposition 5 above, so we abbreviate it here:
Again, the LHS of (31) is linear and the RHS is convex by (19f) and
(19g). By comparing the first derivatives of the LHS and the RHS of (31),
1

>
=
<
 nφmα [∆τ + 1] , (A11)
solving for τ and substituting the result back into (31), we obtain (32).
Furthermore, if there are two intersections of the LHS and the RHS of
(31), the slope of the LHS must be larger than that of the RHS at the
intersection with the lower τ value. Thus, (33) follows directly from the
upper case of (A11).
Similarly, it follows from the ‘middle case’ of (A11) that (33) holds with
equality if there is one solution.
Proof of Proposition 7. We first show (34): Assume that there is a first-best
τ∗ satisfying (27). The RHS of (31) is smaller than the RHS of (27) at τ∗,
since Ω¯ < Ω∗ implies ∆(τ∗, Ω¯) < ∆(τ∗,Ω∗).
Since the RHS of (31) by (19f) and (19g) monotonously increases in τ
at a growing rate, and the LHS of (31) is the identity function as for (27),
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they must intersect at a smaller tax than for the first-best case: there must
be a τ ′ that solves (31) with τ ′ < τ∗.
Since the RHS of (31) starts from 1/M [∆(τ = 0, Ω¯) + 1] > 0, and thus
above the identity function, we also have τ ′ > 0.
Relation (35) follows by the same logic, since a lower constraint on Ω
implies a smaller ∆ at the ’old’ intersection. Formally, in the argument
above, just replace τ ′ by τ ′(Ω¯2) and Ω¯ by Ω¯2, as well as τ∗ by τ ′(Ω¯1) and
Ω∗ by Ω¯1.
Proof of Proposition 8. We first show (37) and then that there are at most
two non-zero solutions.
The proof of (37) has two parts: we show that the same relation holds
for another specific Ω 6= Ω′, and then show that this implies the claim.
Define Ωˆ as the solution to
Ω =
∆(τ¯ ,Ω)
1 + τp(τ¯ ,Ω)
. (A12)
In Fig. 2, this is the intersection of the linear LHS of (36) and the lowest
curve described by the first fraction on the RHS of (36), the ratio of marginal
total costs of clean and dirty consumption. For Ω → 0, this fraction goes
to zero (because ∆ goes to zero and τp towards a finite value), but its slope
becomes infinitely large:
lim
Ω→0
d
dΩ
∆
1 + τp
= lim
Ω→0
δρη
M + 1 + τ¯
M(1 + τp)2
∆
Ω
= const. · lim
Ω→0
Ωδρη−1 =∞,
since δρη < 1 by (19f) and (19g). Hence, it grows faster than (and is above)
the LHS of (A12) near the origin. As Ω increases, it grows monotonously
with a decreasing slope towards an upper bound:
lim
Ω→∞
∆
1 + τp
l’Hoˆpital
= lim
Ω→∞
∆Ω
1/M∆Ω
= M. (A13)
Thus,
Ω <
∆(τ¯ ,Ω)
1 + τp(τ¯ ,Ω)
⇔ Ω < Ωˆ, (A14)
and vice versa for Ω > Ωˆ, so (A12) has exactly one solution.
Now, to show that (37) holds for Ωˆ, we need to show that the second
term on the RHS of (36), in square brackets, is larger than one at Ω = Ωˆ,
which is the case if
τp(τ¯ , Ωˆ) > τ¯. (A15)
By (24), such a relation holds for any Ω if (M − 1)τ¯ < 1. Otherwise, we
need another auxiliary construction:
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Define Ω˜ as the solution to
τp(τ¯ ,Ω) = τ¯ , (A16)
and note that since τp is an increasing function of Ω,
τp(τ¯ ,Ω) > τ¯ ⇔ Ω > Ω˜. (A17)
It follows that if Ω˜ < Ωˆ, (A15) holds. We thus need to show that the left
part of (A14) holds for Ω˜.
To do so, note that (A16) by (24) implies ∆(τ¯ , Ω˜) = (M−1)τ¯−1. Hence,
we can rewrite (A14) for Ω = Ω˜ as
Ω˜ <
(M − 1)τ¯ − 1
1 + τ¯
. (A18)
Substituting Ω˜ with the help of (20) and reordering (using (M − 1)τ¯ ≥ 1)
yields
(M − 1)τ¯ − 1 <
[
β
1− β (1 + τ¯)
1−δρ
]η/(1−δρη)
. (A19)
Using the definition of ∆∗ from (27), we obtain
τ¯ <
1
M
[∆∗(τ¯) + 1 + τ¯ ] . (A20)
The RHS of (A20) is a convex function of τ¯ and always positive (see also Fig.
1 and the proof of Proposition 5). Thus, it is larger than the unity function
on the LHS up to a potential intersection, which by (27) and Proposition 5
is the first-best τ∗: in this case our second-best assumption τ¯ < τ∗ implies
that (A20) is true. If there is no such intersection, (A20) is trivially true
(and there is no first-best solution).
Thus, we have shown that (37) holds for Ω = Ωˆ. It remains to be shown
that this implies that it also holds for Ω = Ω′:
The second term on the RHS of (36) in the square brackets is larger
than one by (A15) for Ω = Ωˆ, and it keeps growing monotonously with
increasing Ω.15 We saw above that the first term on the RHS of (36) also
grows (towards an upper bound, see (A13)). Thus, if the RHS attains the
same value as the LHS, this will be at a value Ω′ > Ωˆ, and the term in the
square brackets on the RHS will be larger than for Ωˆ, so (37) from the main
text follows.
15More precisely, it grows to infinity at a monotonously decreasing slope that converges
to η/M , since
lim
Ω→∞
d
dΩ
[
τp − τ¯
τp
(1 + Ω)
]
= lim
Ω→∞
[
τp − τ¯
τp︸ ︷︷ ︸
→1
+
δρητ¯
M
1 + Ω
Ω
∆
τ2p︸︷︷︸
→0
]
= 1.
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Now, consider the number of solutions. Overall, the RHS of (36) grows
faster than the LHS for Ω → 0, and also for Ω → ∞: Since the term in
square brackets grows at a rate that converges to η/M , while the fraction in
front of the bracket converges to a constant M , the slope of the entire RHS
converges to η, which is larger than one (by σ > 1) and thus larger than the
slope of the LHS. Nevertheless, the derivative of the RHS may fall below
that of the LHS ‘in between’, for example if the growth of the first term on
the RHS slows down fast (because this term then itself contributes less to
overall growth of the RHS, and because it acts as a weight to the growth
contribution of the second term in the square brackets, which will then be
small). In this case, the RHS will have a ‘curved’ shape as in Figure 2: If
growth of the RHS increases too fast after the slowdown, it does not have
any point in common with the LHS, and there is no solution to (36). If the
LHS is tangent to the RHS, there is only one solution. If the RHS has a first
intersection with the LHS at Ω′L, the fact that the RHS becomes steeper
afterwards until it reaches a slope larger than that of the LHS implies that
there is a second solution at Ω′H > Ω
′
L (see inset in Figure 2).
This concludes the proof.
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